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A b stra c t
In this paper we propose th a t distinguishing different types of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in term s of M ultinational (MNE) ownership may help to  interpret the inconclusive 
empirical results on knowledge spillover effects from FDI. We frame the relationship between 
MNE ownership of FDI and knowledge spillovers on three well estbalished microeconomic 
concepts: spillover channels, tacit knowledge and absorptive capacity. Integrating these aspects 
in one comprehensive framework, we arrive at a non-linear relationship between MNE ownership 
and spillovers. We also find th a t the th reat of knowledge spillovers makes th a t MNEs usually 
require relatively extreme degrees of ownership over their foreign affiliates. Confronting this w ith 
the empirical literature, we show th a t neglecting these insights has im portant consequences for 
estim ation and may indeed explain the observed diversity in results.
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1 Introduction
Research on knowledge spillovers from Foreign D irect Investm ent (FDI) has been expanding rapidly 
over the  past few years (cf. Saggi, 2002; Keller, 2004). The m ajority  of such studies are empirical in 
nature . Remarkably, however, these studies appear to  offer little  consensus about the  existence, 
m agnitude or direction of knowledge spillovers (Gorg and Greenaway, 2004; B arba N avaretti and 
Venables, 2004). These mixed findings are typically a ttr ib u ted  to  differences in applied m ethods or 
m easurem ent issues (Gorg and  Strobl, 2001).
In th is paper we pu t forward an  alternative reason for the  lack of empirical consensus, namely 
th e  lite ra tu re ’s neglect of tak ing  into account differences in ownership structures of FD I ventures. 
T h a t is, th e  m ajority  of the  theoretical and em pirical lite ra tu re  disregards the  fact th a t  FD I is in 
practice composed (of varieties) of m inority partnerships, m ajority  partnerships, and  (equally shared) 
jo in t ventures. In th is  paper we carefully consider the  relationship between types of FD I and 
knowledge spillovers and  verify w hat th is  would im ply for the  em pirical assessm ent of knowledge 
spillovers from FDI.
The insights we yield are based on th ree well-established concepts from microeconomic theory  
on knowledge spillovers in relation to  FD I. The first of these concepts is the  existence of knowledge 
spillover channels, for which we argue th a t  different types of FD I involve different (num bers of) 
channels (Djankov and  Hoekman, 2000; Saggi, 2002). Second, we recognize th a t  it is m ainly tac it 
knowledge th a t  is bound to  lead to  knowledge spillovers (M akhija and  Ganesh, 1997; Aydogan and 
Lyon, 2004). T hird , we acknowledge th a t  the  absorptive capacity of the  (potential) p artner firm 
plays a key role as well (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Lane et al., 2001; Grunfeld, 2003). Combining 
these insights, we conclude th a t  the  relationship between knowledge spillovers and  FD I ownership is 
non-linear. Knowledge spillovers from FD I will be low for either low or high levels of integration  (e.g. 
licensing or full ownership), while it is high for in term ediate in tegration  modes (e.g. jo in t ventures). 
By incorporating  th is relationship in a partia l equilibrium  framework governing th e  investm ent and 
en try  mode decision of MNEs, it appears th a t  th is  implies th a t  when knowledge spillovers m atter,
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firms ten d  to  choose extrem e types of ownership. Confronting our findings w ith the  empirical 
lite ra tu re  on knowledge spillovers and  FD I, we conclude th a t  the  different findings in the  literature  
m ay indeed be dependent on m easurem ent issues (Gorg and  Strobl, 2001), bu t for a different reason. 
T h a t is, we argue th a t it is not so much the  m easurem ent of m ultinational presence, bu t ra ther the  
lack in m easurem ent of different types of FD I th a t  m atters. An overview of the  em pirical literature  
th a t  takes ownership structures explicitly into account makes clear th a t  m aking such a distinction 
indeed m atters.
The rem ainder of th is  paper is s truc tu red  as follows. Section 2 discusses some general aspects of 
knowledge spillovers and  establishes its relationship w ith different types of FD I ownership. In Section 
3 we formalize th is  in a simple p artia l equilibrium  model for the  investm ent and en try  mode decision 
of m ultinationals. Section 4 confronts stan d ard  em pirical practice regarding knowledge spillovers 
w ith our framework. Section 5 concludes.
2 K now ledge Spillovers and FD I
Previous lite ra tu re  provides a host of possible taxonom ies according to  which knowledge spillovers 
can be classified. D istinctions have been m ade between knowledge versus ren t spillovers (Grilliches, 
1979), em bodied versus disem bodied spillovers (Grunfeld, 2003) and  active versus passive spillovers 
(Keller, 2004). For our purposes, however, it is im portan t to  make a d istinction between knowledge 
transfer on the  one hand, and knowledge spillovers on the  other. The m ain difference is th a t  a 
knowledge transfer is an  intentional transm ission of knowledge from one party  to  another, whereas a 
knowledge spillover is unintentional. This implies th a t  a knowledge spillover should be though t of as 
an  externality, in contrast to  a knowledge transfer. Moreover, a knowledge transfer can be bo th  
intra-firm  and  inter-firm , whereas a knowledge spillover, by definition of being an  externality, only 
occurs between different firms.
E stablished theories of the  M ultinational Enterprise (MNE) such as D unning’s (1977) 
O LI-paradigm  or M arkusen’s (2002) knowledge capital model, all imply th a t  FD I is a channel for
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knowledge transfer. For w hat these theories have in common is the  assum ption th a t  a firm needs 
some com petitive (knowledge) asset in order to  become a MNE. By engaging in FD I, th e  firm 
transfers (some of) th is knowledge to  its foreign affiliate, thus being able to  exploit its asset abroad 
as well.1 A nother approach tow ard the  explanation of MNEs (which is also incorporated  in the  OLI 
paradigm ) is based on W illiam son’s (1975) transaction  costs economics (H ennart, 1982; Teece, 1983; 
Beam ish and  Banks, 1987). This approach posits th a t  in serving foreign m arkets th rough trad e  or 
licensing agreem ents, transaction  costs arise due to  im perfect m arkets. In the  present context, 
m arkets fail because they  do not allow firms to  fully appropriate the  knowledge th a t  they  exploit 
th rough exporting the ir p roducts or licensing the ir production. The solution provided by transaction  
costs economics is to  internalize the  foreign m arket, and  consequently to  become a MNE.
The im plication is th a t  if a firm w ants to  exploit its knowledge abroad as well as prevent it from 
being appropria ted  by o ther firms, it should engage in FD I. Müller and  Schnitzer (2006) generalize 
th is  insight by proposing a negative relationship between a M N E’s degree of in tegration (i.e. its 
am ount of ownership in a foreign affiliate) and  th e  extent of knowledge spillovers th a t  it generates, 
th e  reason being th a t  increased ownership increase th e  M N E’s control over the  knowledge (or 
alternatively, decreases its p a rtn e r’s access to  it). B ut a t the  same tim e, the  perceived decreased 
spillover th re a t due to  increased in tegration will lead the  M NE to  transfer more of its knowledge 
abroad, thus increasing the  to ta l stock of knowledge present there. This in tu rn  will increase the  
poten tia l for knowledge to  spill over. A paradox th en  presents itself: Increasing its degree of control 
over the  foreign affiliate will lead the  M NE to  transfer more of its knowledge abroad, since it 
perceives a decreased spillover th rea t. The increased knowledge transfer, however, increases the 
spillover th rea t, as it increases th e  stock of knowledge abroad. A way out of th is paradox is by 
carefully reth inking the  relationship between the  M N E’s in tegration in th e  foreign venture and  the 
extent of knowledge spillovers. In w hat follows, we do so by linking it to  three well-established 
concepts in th e  literature: knowledge spillover channels, tac it knowledge and absorptive capacity.
Previous lite ra tu re  (Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Saggi, 2002) suggests th ree m ain spillover
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channels: dem onstration  effects, m eaning th a t  others observe and im itate  th e  (applied) knowledge; 
labor turnover, enabling workers employed by the  M NE undertak ing  the  FD I to  switch jobs and  take 
w ith them  firm-specific knowledge; and  vertical linkages, by which the  M NE may spill over 
knowledge or technology to  its suppliers (upstream  linkages) or its custom ers (dow nstream  linkages).
Consequently, we should be able to  establish a relationship between th e  M N E’s integration 
decision and spillovers by exam ining th e  relevant spillover channels .2 Consider th ree types of FDI: 
M inority FD I (where the  M NE has a m inority stake in a foreign affiliate, e.g. th rough licensing), 
Jo in t Venture (JV  - where the  M NE equally shares th e  foreign affiliate w ith a foreign partner) and 
W holly Owned Subsidiary (WOS - where the  M NE has a m ajority  stake in - and  in th is case is the 
sole owner of - th e  affiliate). We first examine th e  relevance of dem onstration effects as a spillover 
channel. As is apparen t from its definition, th is channel is only relevant when there  exists a p artner 
to  dem onstrate to  (Cheung and  Ling, 2004). Hence, dem onstration  effects only apply to  M inority 
FD I and  JVs, bu t not to  a W OS. Second, labor turnover requires employees th a t  have acquired some 
of the  M N E’s knowledge to  switch jobs. In the  case of JV  and  WOS, it is apparen t th a t  local workers 
are exposed to  M NE knowledge which they  may exploit elsewhere. B u t in the  case of M inority FDI, 
transaction  costs economics tells us th a t  the  M NE is unlikely to  transfer (crucial) knowledge abroad, 
rendering labor turnover irrelevant as a spillover channel in th is case (cf. Fosfuri et al., 2001). Third, 
vertical linkages require the  presence of a local network of suppliers and  custom ers in order to  
tran sm it knowledge. Since for M inority FD I and JV  local partners are involved, it is likely th a t  part 
of the ir network will be utilized as well. A W OS, by contrast, has a much less extensive network, a t 
least in the  short term , and  is therefore unlikely to  spill over knowledge in th is way (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2006).
This implies th a t  JVs potentially  involve the  largest spillover th rea t, as all spillover channels 
m ay be a t work in th is case, th en  followed by M inority FD I and W OS. By itself, th is  would suggest a 
nonlinear relationship between the  M N E’s degree of in tegration and knowledge spillovers, bu t of 
course th is would be only tru e  if all th e  spillover channels function for the  relevant types of FD I and
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if each channel is equally im portan t in tran sm ittin g  knowledge.
The existence of a nonlinear relationship becomes more likely however, if we also take into 
account the  tac it na tu re  of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is knowledge em bodied in intangibles (people, 
routines, experience) and  consequently requires com m unication or face-to-face interaction to  spill over 
(M akhija and  Ganesh, 1997; Aydogan and  Lyon, 2004). This as opposed to  codified knowledge, which 
is em bodied in tangibles (books, cd-roms, products) and consequently requires less com m unication to  
spill over. Given th a t  it is easier to  w rite contingent contracts on the  application and division of 
codified knowledge (patents, tradem arks, copyright), a large p a rt of knowledge spillovers is bound to  
be tac it (e.g. sharing experiences a t the  coffee-machine or over lunch). Consequently, th e  types of 
FD I th a t  facilitate tac it knowledge spillovers are those th a t  involve intense com m unication and 
interaction. The largest spillover th rea t can thus be expected from JVs, as these involve much more 
frequent and  intensive in teraction  between partners th a n  M inority FD I and  WOS would. Also from 
th is  perspective, therefore, a non-linear relationship arises between M NE integration  and  spillovers.3
Finally, we should also consider th e  firm(s) a t the  o ther end of the  (spillover) channel, the  local 
partn er (or partners). I t has been firmly established in th e  lite ra tu re  th a t  the  beneficial effects of 
knowledge spillovers do not arise unconditionally. A key a ttr ib u te  to  be able to  receive knowledge is 
a sufficient degree of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Lane et al., 2001; Grunfeld, 
2003). A firm can build up absorptive capacity by investing in R&D or hum an capital, enhancing the 
assim ilation of outside knowledge and  knowledge spillovers. At th e  same tim e, however, increasing its 
own knowledge base may render outside knowledge less useful for a firm, since it is closing the 
knowledge gap. The absorptive capacity argum ent provides another building block for the  non-linear 
relationship between M NE integration  and  FD I. Since there  is more in teraction  between the  partners 
in the  JV  th a n  in the  o ther types of FDI, as well as the  fact th a t JV s are often established for m utual 
learning processes (Beamish and  Banks, 1987; M akhija and Ganesh, 1997), th e  extent to  which 
knowledge will be (purposefully) transferred  by the  M NE to  th e  local partn er will be larger as well. 
Consequently, the  M NE is also contribu ting  to  its local p a rtn e r’s absorptive capacity in a JV, thus
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increasing th e  poten tia l for knowledge spillovers even further.
Summarizing, when fram ing the  relationship between different types of FD I and knowledge 
spillovers on the  existence of spillover channels, tac it knowledge and absorptive capacity, a non-linear 
relationship arises. Specifically, we find th a t  equally owned types of FD I (such as JVs) will generally 
lead to  larger spillovers th a n  either m inority or m ajority  types of FD I. In the  next section we will 
formalize these insights in a simple p artia l equilibrium  framework to  understand  th e  im plications for 
th e  investm ent and entry  mode decision of MNEs.
3 T he m odel
W hen faced w ith the  choice of investing abroad, the  M NE essentially makes two decisions: It decides 
w hether or not to  engage in FD I and (provided th a t  it decides to  invest) a t w hat degree of 
in tegration  (i.e. ownership) to  do so. To focus on knowledge spillovers, we assume th a t  the  
in tegration  decision is only determ ined by knowledge spillover considerations and, as we will discuss 
below, follows directly from the  investm ent decision. As a sta rtin g  point, we consider technological 
space in the  host country in which the  M NE is considering to  invest. The location of b o th  the  MNE 
and  its poten tia l p artn er firm in technological space is modeled in a Hotelling-like fashion (Hotelling, 
1929). Specifically, we assume th a t  the  n  host country firms are located a t equal distances from each 
other and  th a t th e ir location is fixed along a line. W ithou t loss of generality we normalize th e  length 
of th is line to  1 so th a t  the  distance between two local firms becomes 1 /n .4 Accordingly, for n  >  2 
(an assum ption th a t  we will make th roughout the  paper), the  M NE will always locate in between two 
local firms. Technological distance x is then  defined as the  distance between th e  M NE and the  local 
firm th a t  it is closest to, i.e. 0 <  x <  1 /2n. Given th a t  the  M NE decides to  invest (which it will only 
if net profits are nonnegative, an issue th a t  we will re tu rn  to  later), the  problem  it faces is to  choose 
th e  degree of in tegration th a t  maximizes profits net of knowledge spillovers.
D enoting the  M N E’s degree of in tegration by I  we can model the  non-linear, concave 
relationship between knowledge spillovers and I  th a t  we derived in the  previous section as follows:
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g (I  ) =  - 1 2 +  I (1)
The degree of in tegration  I , in tu rn , is determ ined by the  technological distance x between the  MNE 
and  its local partner. We argue th a t  th e  M NE will consider technological proxim ity to  its local 
partn er as a th rea t and  thus increases its degree of in tegration  when its partn er is technologically 
more similar. This view is in line w ith the  theories alluded to  in Section 2. I t is also in line w ith 
M akhija and  Ganesh (1997) and  M ultinelli and Piscitello (1998) who argue th a t asym m etry in 
capabilities between JV  partners is one of the  key m otivations to  form a JV  in the  first place. 
Therefore we specify a negative relationship between in tegration and  technological distance:
into two com ponents: absorptive ability  and absorption  potential. B oth  of these com ponents are 
related  to  the  degree of technological sim ilarity between th e  M NE and  its partner: If bo th  firms are 
technologically very similar, absorptive ability is high because the  p artn er firm is technologically able 
enough to  absorb the  M N E’s knowledge. However, absorption poten tia l is low in th is  case, due to  the  
absence of a large technological gap (and thus learning potential) between th e  M NE and  its partner. 
Conversely, if bo th  firms are technologically very dissimilar, absorptive ability  is low because the 
partn er firm does not have the  technological requirem ents to  absorb th e  M N E’s knowledge. B u t now, 
because of the  presence of a large technological gap, absorption poten tia l is high. B oth  effects 
combined im ply a curvilinear, concave relationship between technological distance and  the  am ount of 
knowledge spillovers th rough absorptive capacity h(x):
I  = 1  — 2xn s.t. 0 <  x < 1 /2n (2)
Note th a t  th is form ulation ensures th a t  I  is bounded on the  dom ain [0, 1].
To take account of the  absorptive capacity of the  local p artner firm, we split absorptive capacity
h(x) =  x(
1
ox) s.t. a >  2 (3)n
where a is the  inverse of absorptive ability  and  the  x in front of the  parentheses represents absorption
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potential. T he inclusion of the  term  1 /n  guarantees th a t  h(x) reaches its optim um  w ithin the  dom ain 
of the  m odel.5 As technological distance x is defined w ith respect to  the  local firm th a t  is closest to  
th e  MNE, so th a t 0 <  x <  1 /2n ,our discussion of the  curvilinearity between S  and  x implies th a t 
h(x) should reach its optim um  w ithin th is interval. This is indeed guaranteed by the  inclusion of the 
term  1/n ,  given the  restriction  a >  2 .
We are now able to  construct a spillover function th a t  depends b o th  on th e  M N E’s degree of 
in tegration  g ( I ) and  the  local partn er firm s’ absorptive capacity h(x):
S  =  F  [g(I),h (x )] (4)
For simplicity, we assume th a t  F (.) is a positive additive function in its argum ents. Accordingly, 
using the  form ulations in (1), (2) and  (3), we arrive a t the  following explicit form ulation of the 
spillover function :6
S  =  —x 2(a +  1) +------ (5)
2n
O f course, the  M N E’s in tegration  decision is not solely dependent on the  am ount of spillovers it 
faces. Therefore, we also introduce a simple profit function. We assume th a t  JV  profits (i.e. the  
profits of bo th  the  M NE and  its partn er firm) are positively related  to  technological distance x (again 
in line w ith the  postu la ted  need for asym m etry) and negatively related  to  the  to ta l num ber of local 
firms (which represents a m arket stealing effect):
J  x  (6)
n
The M N E’s share of these profits is proportional to  its degree of ownership I , m inus some am ount of 
sunk costs c th a t  it has to  incur when investing in the  host country:
/  x \  9 x
^ m n e  =  I  -  ) -  c =  —2x +------- c (7)
n n
Note th a t  the  M NE profit function becomes a concave function of technological distance and  also of 
th e  degree of in tegration (by virtue of (2)). This implies th a t  increased technological distance first
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leads to  increased M NE profits (at a decreasing rate), th en  reaches a m axim um  and thereafter lowers 
MNE profits (at an  increasing rate). This relationship is caused by two opposing effects following 
from an  increase in x. O n th e  one hand, an  increase in x induces an  increase in k j v  (and thus an 
increase in k m n e ) due to  an  increase in asym m etry between the  M NE and  its partner. On the  o ther 
hand, an increase in x also induces a decrease in I  and  thu s lowers M N E’s share of k j v . As long as 
th e  former effect outweighs the  la tte r, M NE profits will increase.
An im portan t im plication from the  concavity of M NE profits and knowledge spillovers w ith 
respect to  I  is th a t  we ob tain  potentially  two M NE partic ipation  constraints. W ithou t the  presence 
of knowledge spillovers, the  partic ipation  constrain ts could simply be derived from the  condition th a t 
i m n e  >  0. However, since we explicitly allow for knowledge spillovers, th is condition becomes 
i m n e  — S  >  0. Note th a t  when th is  condition is satisfied, not only do we know th a t  the  M NE will 
engage in FDI, bu t we can also im m ediately derive the  degree(s) of in tegration a t which it will do so. 
We illustra te  th is graphically by m eans of Figure 1 below.
< <  IN S E R T  F I G U R E  1 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
The solid curve in the  figure denotes knowledge spillovers S  and  the  dashed curve denotes MNE 
profits 'Km n e , b o th  as a function of the  degree of integration. The partic ipation  constrain t is 
determ ined a t the  point where knowledge spillovers are equal to  profits. From the  figure it follows 
th a t  there  are potentially  two partic ipation  constraints: a lower constrain t I l and an  upper 
constrain t I u . Formally, we can derive the  partic ipation  constraints by letting  S  in (5) equal k m n e  
in (7). Using (2) to  express the  derived x values in term s of I , we get
I l  =  1 -  7 - ^  ; I u  =  1 -  7-^—r r  (8)(a — 1) (a — 1)
where
A =  2 n i + 4 c (a  “ !) (9)
In between these two constraints, knowledge spillovers are larger th a n  M NE profits and  the  M NE will 
not invest in the  host country. Consequently, only for degrees of in tegration lower (higher) th a n  I l
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( I u ) will the  M NE invest in the  host country. Knowledge spillovers im ply th a t  MNEs invest when 
they  can choose extrem e levels of ownership. We note th a t  from Figure 1 it may appear th a t  the  
M NE will always choose for the  m ost extrem e degrees of in tegration (i.e. 0% or 100%), as these 
maximize net profits. However, in the  long run  the  M NE will only earn norm al re tu rns (i.e. net 
profits will be zero) and the  degrees of in tegration  a t which the  M NE is willing to  invest are exactly 
given by th e  two partic ipation  constraints.
Given th a t in the  present setup bo th  M NE profits as well as spillovers are a concave function of
I , the  interests of th e  M NE and  its partner (or more generally, the  host economy) are aligned from 
th e  outset of the  model. This is in contrast to  a recent model by M üller and  Schnitzer (2006), where 
th e  government of the  host country needs to  engage in active policy in order to  (partly) align the 
in terests of b o th  parties. One of th e  reasons for th is  difference m ight be th a t  in M üller and Schnitzer 
(2006) knowledge spillovers are assum ed to  be linearly declining in ownership, whereas M NE revenue 
is linearly increasing in ownership. O ur framework, by contrast, includes the  non-m onotonic 
relationship we derived in the  previous section, including an  explicit acknowledgement of the  
absorptive capacity of the  host country.
4 T he Em pirical L iterature
As already m entioned in th e  in troduction, there  exists a large lite ra tu re  on knowledge spillovers from 
FD I th a t  largely neglects the  fact th a t  there  exist different types of FD I in term s of M NE integration. 
Nonetheless, there  is also a fairly recent and rapidly growing s tran d  of em pirical research th a t  does 
acknowledge th is  fact. In th is section we will first briefly consider w hat our insights im ply for the 
stan d ard  empirical practice in the  m ajority  of the  FDI-spillover studies th a t  disregard differences in 
M NE in tegration .7 T hen we will briefly review the  em pirical lite ra tu re  th a t  does analyze the  spillover 
effects of different types of FD I and com m ent on its m ain assum ptions and findings.
The empirical estim ation function th a t  is often encountered in the  FDI-spillover lite ra tu re  has 
th e  following generic form:
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! it =  F itft +  X it7  +  D i +  D t +  Sit (10)
where i and  t  index cross-section (firm, sector, region, nation or a com bination of these) and  tim e 
respectively. !  usually is a m easure of p roductiv ity  (either labor productiv ity  or to ta l factor 
p roductiv ity), F  is a m easure for th e  presence of FD I (often FD I stock or flows in macroeconomic 
studies, and FD I ou tp u t or employm ent as a share of to ta l ou tp u t or employm ent in microeconomic 
studies), X  is a vector of controls (often including investm ents in R&D and  hum an capital) and  Di 
and  D t are cross-section and tim e dummies. Hence, the  general stra tegy  is to  explain productiv ity  by 
all of its known determ inants (or alternatively, the  determ inants for which d a ta  are available) and 
a ttr ib u te  any effect th a t  is left (apart from m easurem ent error) to  FDI.
Here we focus on th e  effect of not distinguishing different types of FD I in models such as (10) .8 
According to  our discussion in Sections 2 and  3, F  is actually  given by F  =  ^ jm ax F j s.t. I  2  [0, 1]. 
T h a t is, it is composed of a host of FD I-types th a t  differ from each other in term s of the ir degree of 
M NE integration I . I t also implies th a t  the  estim ator ft is a vector of dimension N  x  1 where 
N  =  I min , ..., Imax. Hence accounting for different types of FD I in term s of M NE integration would 
allow for different estim ated spillover effects of each type. D epending on the  circum stances in the  
relevant cross-section i, th e  curvatures of th e  spillover and  profit functions in Figure 1 could either 
allow for FD I-types across the  entire I-space , or across subsets of I-space. In the  la tte r case, it 
should be noted  th a t  our model implies th a t  there  will be an  interval [Iiow, Ihigh] so th a t 
F  =  V J 1ow F j +  V jm ax F j , i.e. w ithin th is interval FD I will not occur. Given the  non-linear— 1 min 1 ¿—‘¡h ig h  1 ’
relationship we specified between spillovers and integration, it also implies th a t if th is  interval 
becomes wider, observed spillovers from FD I become relatively lower and  the  estim ated  coefficient 
vector ft will become smaller in m agnitude (or insignificant) as well.
From th is  it follows th a t  not distinguishing between different types of FD I and  estim ating the 
model as specified in (10) implies th a t the  estim ated  coefficient ft is a consolidated estim ate of all the  
different ftj corresponding to  the  different F j  th a t  are present in i a t tim e t. Consequently, the
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estim ated  effect ft depends on the  types of FD I th a t  are present in e.g. an economy. The com position 
of F  will generally differ across economies i as well as over tim e t. This implies th a t  the  w idth of the 
interval [Iiow,Ihigh] will generally depend on i and  t  as well. E stim ating  a low or insignificant ft and 
concluding th a t  there  are no spillover effects from FD I is thus unw arranted, as it could very well 
im ply th a t  an  economy is "overrepresented" w ith those types of FD I (m inority or m ajority  FD I) th a t 
induce few spillovers. We should also stress th a t  the  sym m etric concave relationship between 
spillovers and M NE integration in Figure 1 is ju s t an  illustration, and the  optim um  of the  function 
could be b o th  lower or higher, as well as more to  the  left or right of I  =  0.5. Again, th is  may very 
well depend on bo th  i and t.
All of th is implies th a t  th e  great d isparity  in empirical results may be indirectly related to  
differences in (country) samples studied  or periods considered, as different places and  tim es will 
generally lead to  different com positions of F . T h a t is, m easurem ent issues may indeed be a t the  
heart of the  diverging results in the  lite ra tu re  (cf. Gorg and  Strobl, 2001). Yet the  problem  is not so 
much abou t how to  m easure m ultinational presence (e.g. in term s of employm ent or ou tpu t), bu t 
ra th e r abou t inappropriately  pooling different types of FD I to g e th er .9 The disregard for different 
types of FD I may indeed go a long way tow ard explaining the  diverse em pirical resu lts .10
However, a fairly recent and rapidly developing lite ra tu re  has been increasingly tak ing  the 
differences in M NE integration into account while estim ating spillover effects. One of the  first to  do 
so were Blom strom  and  Sjoholm (1999). These au thors analyze a sample of 13,663 Indonesian 
m anufacturing firms in 1991 and  try  to  establish w hether there  are different spillover effects between 
m inority and  m ajority  owned subsidiaries. T hey find th a t  b o th  types of FD I lead to  spillovers, bu t 
th a t  there  are no sta tistica l differences between the  estim ated spillover effects. Dimelis and  Louri 
(2002) analyze a sample of 4,056 Greek m anufacturing firms in 1997. T heir m ain finding is th a t 
m inority owned FD I is more likely to  spill over knowledge vis-à-vis m ajority  FD I, since the  former 
leads to  spillovers a t all distinguished levels of p roductiv ity  whereas th e  la tte r only leads to  spillovers 
in high-productivity  affiliates. Javorcik (2004) analyzes a panel of approxim ately 2000 firms in
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Lithuania over the  period 1996-2000. She explicitly looks a t vertical (inter-industry) spillovers as 
opposed to  horizontal (in tra-industry) spillovers and finds th a t  shared ownership between the  foreign 
investor and  a local firm induces in ter-industry  spillovers, whereas WOS do not. However, she finds 
no statistically  different effect of m inority versus m ajority  FDI. Finally, Javorick and  Spatareanu 
(2006) analyze a panel of 13,129 R om anian firms over the  period 1998-2003. T hey find th a t  shared 
foreign and dom estic ownership induces positive vertical spillovers bu t negative horizontal spillovers. 
Moreover, WOS does not induce vertical spillovers, bu t even larger negative horizontal spillovers.
These findings may seem som ewhat contradictive a t first sight. However, given th a t  they  all 
investigate the  relationship between knowledge spillovers and  FD I ownership a b it differently, the 
results are not directly  com parable either. A common finding is th a t  shared ownership between 
foreign and local investors induces spillovers, whereas fully owned types of FD I do not. The reason 
th a t  Javorcik (2004) and  Javorcik and  Spatareanu (2006) do not find differences between m inority 
and  m ajority  owned FD I is th a t  they  do not make th is  distinction. T he reason th a t  Dimelis and 
Louri (2002) do not find separate horizontal and  vertical spillover effects is again because they  do not 
distinguish these.
Moreover, in term s of our model in Section 3, the  results by Blom strom  and  Sjoholm (1999) are 
particu larly  interesting. Recall th a t  these au thors do find positive spillover effects of m inority and 
m ajority  FD I, bu t these are not sta tistically  different. This finding corresponds nicely w ith the 
in tu ition  and  results of our model. I t may accordingly be in terpreted  as a first clue for the  non-linear 
relationship between M NE integration  in FD I and  knowledge spillovers.
R egarding future empirical work, an  additional com m ent is in order. Instead  of analyzing the  
relationship between FD I ownership and knowledge spillovers (or firm productivity) by using 
FD I-type dum m ies for F  in (10), as is done in all the  studies m entioned above, an  alternative and 
perhaps fruitful stra tegy  is to  use the  actual degree of ownership (i.e. 0%-100%) as the  dependent 
variable F . A particu lar advantage of such an  approach is th a t  it allows for sem iparam etric 
regression analysis. In th is  case, instead of th e  linear param etric  model in (10), a partia l linear model
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can be specified:
! it =  g(F ìt) +  X i t j  +  D i +  D t +  su  (11)
In th is model, FD I ownership F  enters th e  model nonparam etrically  th rough g(-). A particu lar 
advantage of th is type  of m odeling is th a t  it does not require the  specification of a functional form of 
g (F it ). Instead, applying a difference-based sem iparam etric estim ator to  (11) allows one to  first 
estim ate the  coefficient vector 7  as if the  nonparam etric  com ponent is not present, and  subsequently 
to  estim ate g(Fit ) nonparam etrically  conditional on 7  (Yatchew, 1997; 2003). Such an approach is 
particu larly  useful when there  are no unam biguous a priori expectations regarding the  functional 
form of g(-). Since we have posited a concave functional form vis-à-vis the  negative and positive 
linear specifications in earlier literature , a sem iparam etric approach seems w arranted.
5 C onclusion
In th is paper we forward a theoretical explanation for th e  m any different empirical results regarding 
th e  existence, m agnitude and  direction of knowledge spillovers from FD I. We argue th a t  it is 
necessary to  distinguish between different types of FD I in term s of M NE ownership in order to  make 
sense of these results. Drawing on established theories of the  M NE we arrive a t a paradox: In order 
to  p ro tect the ir knowledge from spilling over, MNEs will want to  increase the ir ownership over 
foreign aff liations, bu t by doing so, they  will also transfer more knowledge to  the  aff liation, thus 
increasing th e  knowledge spillover th rea t.
By fram ing the  poten tia l for knowledge spillovers of different types of FD I on three well 
established, microeconomic concepts, we establish a way out of th is  paradox. Specifically, by linking 
knowledge spillovers to  (i) knowledge spillover channels, (ii) the  existence of tac it knowledge and  (iii) 
absorptive capacity, we arrive a t the  conclusion th a t  there  exists a non-linear relationship between 
different types of FD I and  knowledge spillovers, where equally shared types of FD I exhibit the  largest
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spillover poten tia l and  m inority and m ajority  owned FD I much less so. We in tegrated  these insights 
into a p artia l equilibrium  for the  investm ent decision of MNEs, showing th a t  MNEs will typically 
require relatively extrem e degrees of in tegration under the  th re a t of spillovers, relative to  the ir 
preferred degree of in tegration  in the  absence of spillovers.
Confronting existing empirical practice w ith our insights, we find th a t  m any studies 
inappropriately  pool different types of FD I together, thus only estim ating consolidated spillover 
effects of FD I. We also dem onstrate th a t, accordingly, the  em pirical results may indirectly depend on 
th e  countries and periods of interest. This is caused by th e  fact th a t  different types of FD I lead to  
different spillover effects, and  different country-period samples in tu rn  host different com positions of 
FD I-types. Moreover, the  em pirical results of a study  by Blom strom  and  Sjoholm (1999) also give an 
indication of the  validity of the  non-linear relationship between M N E-integration and  spillovers.
So where do we go from here? F irs t and foremost, we believe th a t  the  field is in need of some 
proper theorizing, since the  empirical studies th a t  take the  relationship between M NE ownership and 
spillovers into account are increasing rapidly, bu t w ithout any theoretical foundation. The point is 
nicely illustrated  by Blom strom  and Sjoholm (1999) who argue th a t  they  have no a priori 
expectation regarding the  sign of the  relationship between M NE ownership and spillovers since there 
are m ultiple forces working in opposite directions. O ur framework incorporates (some of) these 
mechanisms, yielding a first theoretical substan tia tion  of the ir point. Moreover, as is apparen t from 
th e  brief discussion of the  lite ra tu re  in Section 4, empirical studies analyze th e  relationship a t 
different levels, and accordingly, different argum ents and m echanisms may be a t work as well. In th is 
respect, incorporating the  insights of th is paper in a general equilibrium  framework th a t  also takes 
geography into account would be a valuable research strategy. We are currently  developing a New 
Economic Geography model in which m ultinationals are allowed to  choose differing degrees of 
ownership over th e ir foreign aff liates, and  where knowledge spillovers act bo th  as a benefit as well as 
a cost for the  firms in the  model.
From an  em pirical point of view, the  contribution  of th is  paper lies in the  fact th a t  it derives a
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non-linear relationship between M NE ownership and  knowledge spillovers. To our knowledge, such a 
relationship has not been explicitly tested  yet in the  empirical literature. Given th e  fact th a t  the 
relationship is firmly grounded in well established microeconomic insights, as well as the  fact there 
exists empirical lite ra tu re  th a t  supports the  premises on which it is based (Lyles and Salk, 1996; 
M akhija and  Ganesh, 1997; Blom strom  and  Sjoholm, 1999; Lane et al., 2001), we believe th a t  our 
framework provides in teresting  possibilities for fu ture empirical work. As m entioned, one particularly  
in teresting aspect th a t  we are currently  investigating is sem iparam etric estim ation of the  relationship 
between knowledge spillovers and  M NE ownership.
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N otes
1T h is  ty p e  of F D I h as  also b een  coined  asse t ex p lo itin g  F D I (D u n n in g  an d  N aru la , 1995; K u em m erle , 1999). H ow ever, 
in  th e  p a s t  few y ea rs  a u th o rs  have  b e e n  a rg u in g  - b o th  th e o re tic a lly  as w ell as em p iric a lly  - t h a t  asse t seek ing  o r asse t 
au g m e n ta tio n  m ay  also serve as a m o tiv e  for F D I  (A lm eid a , 1996; F osfuri an d  M o tta  1999; S io tis, 1999). T h is  s till 
im plies th e  use of F D I  as a know ledge tra n s fe r  c h an n e l, b u t  in  reverse  d irec tio n . O u r  im p lic it a s su m p tio n  th ro u g h o u t 
th e  p a p e r  is th a t  F D I is of th e  asse t e x p lo itin g  ty p e .
2 S u rp ris in g ly , m uch  of th e  l i te ra tu re  on F D I  a n d  know ledge sp illovers igno res th e se  sp illover ch an n e ls , b u t  ra th e r  
t r e a ts  th e m  as a "b lack  box" (G o rg  an d  S tro b l, 2005).
3L yles an d  S alk  (1996) in d eed  find  ev idence  of sig n ifican tly  h ig h er know ledge a cq u is itio n  in  5 0 /5 0  JV s. B e am ish  an d  
B a n k s  (1987) an d  M a k h ija  a n d  G an esh  (1997) p o in t o u t th a t  in te rn a tio n a l  JV s are  o ften  a im ed  a t  m u tu a l  lea rn in g , 
w hich  also  im plies in te ra c tio n  an d  know ledge tran sm iss io n .
4W e ignore  e n d p o in t p ro b lem s b ecau se  o u r focus is on  th e  M N E ’s lo c a tio n  decision  b e tw een  tw o  h o st firm s, a n d  n o t 
on  m o d elin g  c o m p e titio n  b e tw een  h o s t firm s.
5T h is  fo rm u la tio n  also  im p lies th a t  ab so rp tiv e  c ap ac ity  h ( x )  d ecreases as th e  n u m b e r  of lo ca l firm s n  increase . A n 
in tu it io n  for th is  is th a t  for a g iven  a m o u n t of ab so rp tiv e  cap ac ity , for in s ta n c e  in  te rm s  of sk illed  la b o r  p re sen t in th e  
h o st econom y, an  in crease  in  n  w ill lead  to  a decrease  in ab so rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  p e r  firm , due to  a re a llo c a tio n  of sk illed  
la b o r  over th e  ex te n d e d  se t of lo ca l firm s.
6W h ile  ad d in g  g ( I ) an d  h ( x )  we scale  dow n th e  fo rm er by  4 n 2 . T h e  reaso n  is th a t  we have  no  ex ante  m o tiv a tio n  to  
e x p e c t a re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  S  a n d  n  th ro u g h  I . In d eed , th e  on ly  reaso n  for 2n  to  a p p e a r  in  (2) is to  assu re  th a t  I  is 
b o u n d e d  on  [0,1]. H ence by  d iv id in g  g ( x )  by 4 n 2 we get r id  of th e  u n w a n te d  concave tra n s fo rm a tio n  on 2n  in  (2).
7F or som e excellen t su rv ey s , see G org  an d  G reen aw ay  (2004) an d  B a rb a  N a v a re tti  an d  V enables (2004, C h .7).
8O th e r  p ro b lem s th a t  we do n o t d iscuss here  in c lu d e , b u t  a re  n o t re s tr ic te d  to  (1) f ind ing  th e  a p p ro p ria te  "o th e r"  
d e te rm in a n ts  of p ro d u c tiv ity , (2) exclusion  of o th e r  so u rces of sp illovers su ch  as in te rn a tio n a l  tr a d e  a n d  (3) b iases arising  
from  d ifferences in  m e a su re m e n t of M N E  presence .
9T h is  o b se rv a tio n  is in  sp ir it n o t u n like  th a t  m a d e  by  B lo n in g en  a n d  W ang  (2005) re g a rd in g  in a p p ro p r ia te  poo ling  
of w ea lth y  an d  p o o r  co u n tr ie s  in  em p iric a l F D I s tu d ie s .
10T h e  c r itic a l re a d e r  m ay  o b je c t t h a t  th is  w ould  s till n o t ex p la in  th e  n eg a tiv e  sp illover effects so m e tim es en c o u n te re d  
in  th e  l i te ra tu re  (A itk en  a n d  H arriso n , 1999). H ow ever, we ex p lic ity  d id  n o t co n sid er n eg a tiv e  sp illovers in  o u r m odel 
(cf.  fo o tn o te  1). T h e  line of reaso n in g  cou ld  n o n e th e le ss  b e  ex te n d e d  a long  s im ila r lines in  th is  case.
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IFigure 1: M NE partic ipation  constraints
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